

**01023**

**1962/11/03**

Date: 4/3/92

Intransigent

Amendment

RELEASE	<input type="checkbox"/> D/CLASSIFY	<input type="checkbox"/> D/REFINE	<input type="checkbox"/> D/EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> D/CLASSIFY Only	<input type="checkbox"/> TS authority to CLASSIFY as DOWNGRADE TS to ( ) S or ( ) C OADR
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1. The President of the United States in his letter to Chairman Khrushchev on October 27 stated his understanding of the agreement proposed concerning removal of offensive equipment from Cuba as follows:

"You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba."

2. Although the dismantling of offensive missile systems has commenced, other offensive weapons systems continue to be deployed and no appropriate United Nations observation and supervision has been effected.

3. It is no longer possible, given the stage to which dismantling has proceeded, to assure ourselves by inspection at the sites that even the offensive missile systems which were initially at those sites, will have in fact departed Cuba, at a later date, unless appropriate measures are set in motion immediately. The same consideration pertains to other offensive weapons systems (see separate paper for this list).

4. In view of the apparent inability of the USC to influence the Cuban Government with regard to these appropriate measures, the USC considers that the following minimum steps are required to provide a minimum acceptable substitute for that "appropriate UN observation and supervision" to which both sides are committed and which the intransigence of the Cuban Government has made ineffective.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/LR

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c. All offensive systems after movement from airfields, missile sites, or other deployed location into the port from which they are to be shipped back to the Soviet Union, should be assembled in an open area, uncrated, for aerial photography by the United States.

b. Simultaneous with this photography, Swiss diplomatic personnel in Cuba, in company with representatives of the USSR, if desired, are to maintain a permanent watch on the equipment until it has been crated and loaded on to departing ships in order to insure that such equipment after photography in fact leaves Cuba.

c. IAC personnel embarked on UK station ships will be authorized to inspect departing vessels under instructions to be provided separately.

d. Full aerial surveillance of the Island of Cuba to be maintained until the end of the exportation phase and thereafter if other adequate measures of verification against re-entry of offensive weapons are not effected.

e. USSR and US to provide, each to the other, its list of the numbers of items of those weapons in Cuba indicated by the US as offensive, in order to provide a basis for comparison and permit explanation of apparent discrepancies.